Clash of civilizations

Russia and the United States may not have all the same friends, but they certainly have some of the same mortal enemies.

The Russian security services have alleged that no one else but Osama Bin Laden-the man behind the horrendous bombings of two U.S. embassies and the most prominent figure in the Sunni extremist network-is backing the latest Chechen and Islamic campaign in the North Caucasus.
Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan"s President Askar Akayev has been saying that the armed gangs of Uzbek fundamentalists invading his country and the war in Dagestan are links of one and the same chain, and that the rebels in both regions are supported by the same Bin Laden and his fellow-extremists.
Curiously, the ill-famed Saudi terrorist has recently declared a jihad against the United States, Israel and India, which may mean the beginning of a new global conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations, says Samuel Huntington, a Harvard professor who wrote in 1993 that cultural or religious fault-lines were the most likely source of conflict in the post-cold-war world.

Should this hypothesis be true, the fate of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which finds itself at the crossroads of the Christian and Islamic worlds is far from enviable.
Indeed, according to Huntington"s theory, most of the wars nowadays break out in the zones where two different cultures meet.

Let us try to determine what kind of forces oppose both the Kremlin and the secular regimes in Central Asia at the moment and the gravity of the threat posed by Islamic radicals.
Practically every publication dedicated to the military actions in both Dagestan and Kyrgyzstan mentions the so-called wahhabis.

The first time people in the USSR began talking of wahhabis was in the early 1990s, with the outbreak of a civil war in Tajikistan. Adversaries of the Tajik opposition insisted that it was wahhabis that they fought against, not real Moslems. Indeed, the Islamic opposition, in Tajikistan did put some elements of the Wahhabism into action.

Enter the Wahhabis

Wahhabis emerged in North Caucasus, as well as in Central Asia, in the early perestroika years, when, with the "iron curtain" lifted, preachers from the Arab countries streamed into the Moslem regions of the USSR, while young Moslems from these republics gained access to Islamic higher educational institutions abroad.

Still, just like in Central Asia, local wahhabis strongly objected to being referred to as such.
As Akhmedkadi Akhtayev, a prominent Russian Moslem theologian, told me shortly before his death, "Wahhabis is a label often pinned by ignorant people on Moslem formations which usually differ greatly from each other. The fact is, everybody who protests against the official clergy automatically gets labeled as a wahhabi. To be more exact, you may refer to the so-called North-Caucasian wahhabis as salafites (a general name for Islamic religious figures who, at various times, appealed to the people to focus on the faith and mode of life practiced by the early Moslem community or fundamentalists."

Most likely, Akhtayev's point of view is more or less correct, and in reality every Moslem group on the territory of the former USSR criticizing the regional peculiarities of Islam (which is often complicated by local traditions and even Soviet innovations) is referred to as a wahhabi group.
However, the actual problem is far more serious than slight religious differences. Before perestroika, top Moscow officials seemingly succeeded in adjusting different cultures of the country's peoples to the communist ideology. Alas, this was only possible in a totalitarian regime. Borrowed from abroad and planted in the almost lifeless soil of the former USSR, the West European democratic institutions proved to be useless in the Moslem regions of the collapsed empire. The uncoordinated and rather ill-assorted fundamentalist formations are likely to agree on just one point-they reject both the old communist system and the new Western model of development which replaced it.

In 1991, the opinion of the then Chairman of the Islamic Party of Tajikistan's Revival and currently a leader of the united Tajik opposition, Muhammad Sharifzoda, was quite typical for that time: "The Western countries have their own democracy, while we have ours. Our democracy is incompatible with theirs! In the West, an individual's rights are unrestricted almost to the point of public rights' rejection. In the absence of restrictions, the West is definitely heading for a fall. Quite the contrary, the Soviet Union had its human rights restricted beyond all limit, at least until recently. We are going to strive towards staying in between these two extremes."

The growth of a fundamentalist social base in the CIS is also stimulated by human rights abuse, a phenomenon flourishing in almost every Moslem region of the former USSR. For example, in present-day Dagestan authority has been virtually divided between two social layers, the former party figures and the so-called "new Dagestanis," criminal leaders with strong-arm men at their disposal.
For example, the conflict between the wahhabis in the Kadar zone and top officials in Makhachkala, Dagestan"s capital, first broke out after the fundamentalists refused to pay the local mafia.
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, in their turn, are ruled by "official racket," i.e. corrupted officials. In a situation like this, many Moslems lose their faith in the efficiency of the secular authorities and reach the conclusion that human rights abuse can only be controlled if society functions in compliance with Sharia laws.

The fact that the fundamentalist ideology and nationalism have much in common only gains more popularity for the former-Chechen separatists, along with Tajik and Uzbek fundamentalists, insist that their nations are different and should be protected from "destructive" influence of the West.
So, the current renaissance of Islamic fundamentalism in the Moslem regions of the former USSR appears quite logical. At present, according to official Makhachkala estimates, the share of fundamentalists among the population of Dagestan is nearing 10 percent, while in the early nineties it did not exceed 2 percent. The exact number of Central Asian fundamentalists remains unclear, though it evidently displays a tendency to grow.

Not surprisingly, fundamentalists defend their interests by the means of war, which is, from their point of view, substantiated. True, the Koran says that a Moslem should never be ruled by infidels.
In fact, the situation in both North Caucasus and Central Asia could have remained more or less peaceful. Instead, it worsened after the appearance of Islamic enclaves which rejected their subordination to the official authorities, first Chechnya and then the opposition-led mountainous south-eastern part of Tajikistan (the Karategina Valley).

Subsequently, the events in both regions took a similar turn. Thus, Uzbek Islamic radicals escaped to mountainous regions of Tajikistan where they (probably aided by their Tajik confederates) formed armed units.

Meanwhile, Dagestani wahhabis rushed over to Chechnya to join Khattab's military camps. All the rest was just a question of time. The runaways only had to summon their strength to declare a jihad, or 'holy war'.

Quite naturally, the two Islamic protostates founded de facto within the territory of the CIS made an attempt to join forces. Chechnya, as the most powerful of the two from a military point of view, assumed a leading role. So, Uzbek Islamists, apart from setting up military camps in Tajikistan, also went to Chechnya to consult Khattab about his methods.
It should be noted that the Chechens also had something to learn from their Central Asian confederates. As it is known, back in the Soviet times there used to be a wide network of semi-legal madraseh in the Fergana Valley, operating independently from the secular authorities.
Despite the general piety of the Chechen population, the republic has always been short of theological personnel. In the early nineties, hundreds of young Chechens and Dagestanis came to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to study Islamic law in loca1 underground madrassehs, or theological schools.

Not surprisingly, the Islamic enclaves on the territory of the CIS attracted the attention of fundamentalists from abroad. Indeed, this fact can be confirmed by many independent sources.
For example, Khattab had once fought in Afghanistan along with Bin Laden; later on, Shamil Basayev frequently visited the military camps in this country.
At the same time, we should not overestimate the role that Bin Laden and the likes of him played in the North Caucasian events.

Quite possibly, the Kremlin is simply trying to conceal its own helplessness by accusing the Saudi billionaire. At least, during the Chechen war the fighters received financial support from anywhere but the Islamic radicals abroad.
As a matter of fact, the main source of support for the Chechen resistance came from their fellow-countrymen residing in Russia, The scheme was rather simple. The money that Chechen mafia gathered from Chechen businessmen working in Russia went to purchase weapons for the Chechen rebels from the Russian military. Let us assume that the scheme has remained the same up to the present day.
As it was reported, the fighters in the Kadar zone, Dagestan, were equipped with Russian weapons manufactured in 1999; at the same time, some of the media issued reports, saying that the explosives used in the latest terrorist acts in Russia had been simply purchased from the defense factories in Moscow, rather than from the confederates abroad.

What next?

Despite the evident similarity of the events in Central Asia and North Caucasus, we still can assume that, the prospects of further development of these conflicts are quite different. The authorities of the Central Asian states will most probably prevent the Tajik discord from spreading. Cynical as it may sound, the main factor preventing the spreading of radical Islam in Central Asia is the openly totalitarian regime reigning in Uzbekistan, the regional super power.

Let us recall the terrorist act; in Tashkent last February, when almost every Moslem fundamentalist was arrested, despite the fact that most of them had absolutely nothing to do with underground activities. Though obviously undemocratic, these measures proved effective enough-not only were the terrorists stopped, but the social basis of fundamentalism was eliminated as well.
The well-organized repressive mechanism of the contemporary Uzbek state allows its authorities to have total control over its society, thus preventing the local residents who favor the rebels from rendering them substantial assistance. Any movement made by a group of armed people on the territory of Uzbekistan is immediately reported to the authorities and the terrorists are subsequently eliminated.

We should also note that the current events in Central Asia boosted Uzbekistan's role in the region: a while ago, it was Moscow and not Tashkent whom Bishkek regarded as its strategic partner; today, Kyrgyzstan's political preferences may easily change.

In one of his interviews Kyrgyz president stated that for him, the term "wahhabi" bore no negative connotations, and declared himself an opponent of any repression with respect to this part of Kyrgyz society, which he said was a matter of principle for him.
However, the current positions held by Tashkent and Bishkek on this matter have become practically identical. Obviously, in a situation like this Bishkek will have to comply with the actions taken by Uzbek law enforcers on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, considering that Tashkent is already fighting back the fundamentalists in the mountains of the neighboring state. That Kyrgyzstan may become Uzbekistan's satellite is a distinct possibility.

The exit strategy

Meanwhile, the events in the North Caucasus are likely to take on a totally different turn. As a matter of fact, the Kremlin lost control over several of the region's republics long ago-for example, the majority of the population in Dagestan is armed and, moreover, united into groups of fighters which are, in fact, micro-armies, formed, as a rule, on ethnic grounds.

Experience shows that the Chechen fighters, fully armed, move about North Caucasus and even the "Russian" part of Russia totally unimpeded. So, things being as they are, the Kremlin will hardly be able to stop the export of the "Islamic revolution," the only possible way to defeat the Islamists being a bloody and protracted war.

In this case, the Kremlin automatically falls into a trap set by the Islamic radicals. Supported by the majority of Russians, it may resort to its airforce and more bombing, in order to avoid heavy casualties. This, however, will inevitably result in numerous casualties among Chechen civilians.
Meanwhile, anti-terrorist measures in mainland Russia will lead to a de facto state of emergency. The country"s nascent democracy will slide further into a state of disrepair. Then Islamic radicals can claim victory-at least, in their stated goal of defeating Western-style democratic institutions in Russia.