By Mikhail At a June 1989 press conference in Bonn, West Germany, I was asked a question: "Do you think that a common Europe may be possible while there is the Berlin Wall?"
"The wall can come down as soon as the reasons which first brought it to life disappear. The wall is not the problem," I said.
In the span of just three months the unthinkable had happened: all of eastern Europe had broken free of Communist domination and won the right to resume the independent national existences that Nazi aggression had extinguished beginning in 1938.
The force of popular revulsion against the Stalinist regimes imposed after World War II was the cause of the explosion, and advanced communications technology permitted the news to spread quickly, triggering revolts in one capital after another.
The liberalizing reforms in the Soviet Union appalled the Honecker regime, which in desperation was by 1988 forbidding the circulation within East Germany of Soviet publications it viewed as dangerously subversive. The Berlin Wall was in effect breached in the summer of 1989 when a reformist Hungarian government began allowing East Germans to escape to the West through Hungary's newly opened border with Austria.
By the fall, thousands of East Germans had followed this route, while thousands of others sought asylum in the West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw, demanding that they be allowed to emigrate to the Federal Republic.
At the end of September, Foreign Minister Genscher arranged for their passage to West Germany, but their places were soon taken by another wave of refugees from the German Democratic Republic. Mass demonstrations in the streets of Leipzig and other East German cities defied the authorities and demanded reforms.
The Brezhnev Doctrine discarded
What enabled the popular forces to express themselves, and succeed, however, was singular and simple: our abrogation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Once it became known that the Red Army would not intervene to crush dissent, as it had in all previous crises, the whole Stalinist empire was revealed as a sham and flimsy structure.
For decades, some of our Western apologists had argued that eastern European Socialism was somehow indigenous, even that the East Germans had developed a "separate nationality," and that we had a legitimate security interest in eastern Europe. We ourselves proved them wrong when he let eastern Europe go free in 1989.
Why did we do it? First, I believed that from the moral point of view it was wrong to stand in the way of German reunification, making the next generations of Germans pay the price for historical mistakes of their fathers.
Second, we could prevent reunification only by military force. This would have meant the end of detente and the beginning of a new cold war.
The important thing was to ensure peaceful transition. On October 11, 1989, I had a telephone conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl who assured me that he "was not interested in destabilizing East Germany and hoped that the situation would not get out of control."
"I only wish," he told me, "that East Germany follows your course of progressive reforms. The latest events show that East Germans are ready for them."
Even before they had succeeded in chasing the Communists out of their government, East Germans had already begun to "unify" the country with their feet: 133,000 people picked up and moved westward in the month after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. Such an influx of people placed tremendous strains on West Germany and all but forced Chancellor Kohl to begin immediate measures toward reunification in order to stem the tide.
On Nov. 28, 1989, he shocked the world with his announcement of a 10-point plan under which the East and West German governments would gradually expand their cooperation on specific issues until full economic, then political unity was achieved. He proposed no timetable and emphasized that the process must occur within the contexts of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community, and East-West disarmament regimes.
When on December 5, 1989, I met in Moscow with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher I told him I thought that Kohl"s 10-point plan was an ultimatum.
I said I found it unexpected and outrageous, especially after the constructive dialogue that we had had and which led to what I believed was our common understanding of fundamental issues.
"I thought we had an agreement," I said to Genscher, "but apparently the chancellor no longer needs it. He had assured me that he does not want to destabilize East Germany. Yet yesterday he publicly supported the idea of a confederation of the two German states. A confederation means a common defense and foreign policy. Does that mean that a unified Germany will be in NATO? Or in the Warsaw Pact? Or will it stay neutral? What now? Are you sure you know what you are doing?"
Almost no one was entirely comfortable with the prospect of a reunited Germany. West Germany alone had become the economic colossus of Europe; augmented by the East, it might come to dominate the European Community. Moreover, how was a united Germany to be prevented from aspiring to military power or hegemony in the power vacuum of eastern Europe?
Many people in the Politburo were unlikely to countenance a united Germany fully allied with the United States and the EC, while a neutral Germany might become a loose cannon vacillating between Moscow and the West.
So it was that on the day after the Malta summit, President Bush declared his support for a gradually reunited Germany to remain in NATO and the EC, within a "Europe whole and free." French President Mitterrand warned the Germans against pushing it too hard, while British Prime Minister Thatcher was openly skeptical.
Bush reassured me at Malta that events would not be allowed to get out of control. To underscore our intention to assert their rights in Germany dating back to the 1945 Potsdam conference, we requested a meeting of the old Allied Control Council in Berlin. To underscore their intention to respect Soviet feelings, the other World War II Allied powers (the United States, Great Britain, and France) agreed to meet on December 11.
The reunification of Germany, for so long thought impossible and, by many, perhaps most people in the USSR, France, Britain, and the United States, even undesirable, now suddenly appeared inevitable. Whatever their misgivings, the Allies could hardly deny Germany the right to the self-determination they claimed for themselves and all other peoples.
When members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact convened at Ottawa, on Feb. 11, 1990, Bush skillfully won universal agreement to a prudent format for talks on the unification of Germany. We, along with the French and the British had considered involving the four powers from the start in group negotiations with the Germans.
Bush's plan, however, would permit the German states themselves to work out their future and then submit their wishes to the four powers for final approval. These "two plus four" talks were expected to be a slow, deliberative process.
Two plus four, or Russia against the world
February 10, 1990, I had a long conversation with Helmut Kohl. In my opinion it was during these talks that we discussed all the fundamental aspects of German reunification and all the steps that we had to take.
When Kohl described the situation in East Germany I thought at the time-and I still think so now-he was intentionally dramatizing it. But many of his observations supported what Hans Modrow, who in mid-November replaced Krenz as head of the East German Politburo, had told me 10 days before.
Military security was an important issue. Kohl, who knew of the talks I held with U.S Secretary of State James Baker, said he supported the process of detente. He assured me that Germany would renounce the use of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons.
At the same time he was firmly against German neutrality and reminded me of the consequences of the Versailles Treaty that left Germany isolated. But, echoing Baker, the chancellor said: "We are against NATO expansion."
"I believe the Soviet Union, West Germany and East Germany," I told Kohl, "have no differences on the question of reunification. The Germans will have to make their own choice. This is our position and the Germans must know it."
"We know it," Kohl said.
"Germany has proved," I said, "that it learned lessons of the past. The European and the world communities have recognized the fact."
I also told Kohl I knew of his opposition to the idea of German neutrality. "But," I said, "I still believe Germany should not be part of any military alliances. You must have your own military-enough to ensure your security. There is an opinion that there could be no NATO without West Germany. But will the Warsaw Pact survive without East Germany? I don"t think so. If we agree on the fundamental questions of German reunification, it is important that we also settle this issue."
In fact, the overwhelming will of the German people and the press of events brought negotiations quickly to a head. First, the East German elections on March 18 revealed a strong majority in favor of immediate unification.
Second, the East German economy underwent sudden collapse after the disappearance of Communist discipline and the flight of hundreds of thousands of people.
Third, the East German infrastructure was now revealed as decrepit and backward, the environment grossly polluted, and the currency worthless. Talks began at once on an emergency unification of the two Germanies' economies, and in April, after much hand-wringing, Kohl and the Deutsche Bundesbank accepted a plan to replace the East German currency with deutsche marks on a one-to-one basis.
The "two plus four" talks moved to the foreign ministerial level in May, and within two weeks East and West Germany published their terms for their imminent merger.
Moreover, it would not be achieved by the laborious crafting of a new constitution but by the quicker provisions of Article 23 of the West German Basic Law, whereby new provinces could adhere to the existing constitution by a simple majority vote.
The Bundestag approved these terms on June 21, and West and East Germany were unified economically on July 1.
Assurances were required to the effect that a united Germany, far from making NATO more threatening, would in fact be constrained by its membership in the U.S.-led alliance; that German military power would be limited by treaty and that Soviet troops might remain in East Germany for a time as a guarantee; that Soviet-German relations would improve after unification and yield vital economic assistance for the Soviet Union; and that the new Germany would recognize and respect existing international boundaries.
Bush moved to satisfy the first and second of these desiderata at the NATO summit in July; its declaration defined NATO and the Warsaw Pact as no longer enemies, renounced NATO's long-standing policy on first use of nuclear weapons, agreed to limits (proposed by Shevardnadze) on the size of the German army, and invited the Warsaw Pact countries to establish "regular diplomatic liaison with NATO."
The third desideratum-improved Soviet-German relations-was, of course, up to Chancellor Kohl to satisfy. He offered to cut the German army to 370,000 men, renounce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and aid in financing Soviet troops during an eventual withdrawal over a 3-4-year transition period.
He also extended $5,000,000,000 in credits, with an expectation of more to follow. Kohl also took pains to reassure the French that the new united Germany would pose no threat. In the ongoing EC deliberations about the greater unification to take effect in 1992, Kohl sided constantly and strongly with the French position.
He made it as clear as possible that the Germans were "good Europeans" and that their unity would occur harmlessly within the context of greater European and Atlantic communities.
Calling a spade a spade
Before going to Washington, I met with James Baker in Moscow May 18. I understood from the very beginning that the purpose of his visit was to convince me that Germany must remain in NATO.
"We want Germany to remain in NATO," Baker said, "because unless it is part of European structures, the conditions for repeating the tragic past will always be there."
"European collective security," he said, "remains only a beautiful dream, while NATO is real. If Germany leaves the alliance, it will have to ensure its security, including nuclear security."
I found his logic flawed and said so. I asked him-quite seriously-what he thought of the idea of the Soviet Union joining NATO. If this happened, the alliance would cease to be a cold war weapon, and we could start building a system of common European security.
Baker did his best to avoid answering the question. He only volunteered the opinion that every country had the right to choose its allies. "Should Germany want to join the Warsaw Pact," he said, "we would be against it, but we would not try to stop them. Today, however, both Bonn and Berlin are saying they want to be in NATO. Your Warsaw Pact allies support their decision. We have not tried to influence them."
I knew myself that we could not leave Germany isolated in Europe. Nor could we realistically expect Germany to join the Warsaw Pact which was already in the process of breaking up. I also knew that Kohl was unequivocally in favor of NATO.
When on May 25 I met with French President Mitterrand in Moscow I told him of my talks with Baker and asked him: "So what now?"
"There are political realities that we cannot avoid," he answered. "West Germany is a member of NATO and now-to put it undiplomatically-it absorbs East Germany."
"I thought we were talking of reunification, not of one state absorbing another," I said.
"I also was not talking of absorbing-publicly," Mitterrand replied. "It is only that now, in a private conversation, I"m calling a spade a spade."
A few days later I arrived in Washington. On May 31 Bush and I spoke about Germany"s future for a few hours. Tensions rose when we came to the question of Germany"s membership in NATO. "Here we have fundamental differences," Bush told me. He seemed irritated.
Nevertheless, we found a formula which at the time seemed a compromise solution.
"It is difficult for me to understand you," Bush said. "Maybe, it is because I have no fear of Germany. I don"t see Germany as a threat."
"There must be no misunderstanding here," I told Bush. "We are not afraid of either the United States or Germany. We simply recognise the need to change relations between NATO and the Warsaw pact and replace confrontation with cooperation."
"If Germany decides not to remain in NATO," Bush replied, "it will have the right to make its own choice."
"Then let"s make a public statement," I said. "You will say that a sovereign unified Germany will decide itself whether to remain in NATO, stay neutral, or else." "Any sovereign state has the right to choose which alliance to join," Bush said. "If Germany decides it wants out of NATO and asks the U.S. troops to pull out, we will accept it."
"Then should we say," I proposed, "that the United States and the Soviet Union agree that Germany must decide itself which bloc it will be part of?"
"I"d rather formulate our position this way: the United States support Germany"s membership in NATO, but should the Germans decide otherwise, we will respect their choice."
I agreed. I consider this moment as the moment of the final settlement of the German question.
The Cold War is over
Meanwhile, the bilateral talks between East and West Germans proceeded at an emergency pace. The two governments signed the terms for their political union on August 31.
The four Allied powers then ratified them in their own Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. Those signatures, affixed in Moscow on September 12, formally brought World War II to an end.
The next day Germany and the USSR signed a treaty of 20 years' duration pledging to each other friendly relations and recognition of borders and renouncing the use of force.
The four Allied powers renounced their rights in Germany on October 1, the final settlement took effect on Oct. 3, 1990, and Germans tearfully celebrated their reunification.
One final issue remained-that of Germany's permanent boundaries. Western powers and especially the Polish government had pressured Kohl from the beginning to recognize for all time the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse border and thus the permanent loss to Germany of Silesia, eastern Pomerania, Danzig (Gdansk), and East Prussia.
At first Kohl hung back, earning for himself much abuse from Western statesmen and scaremongers. His tactic seems to have been to make a show of standing up for Germany's lost territories in the east in order to send a message to the Polish government about the need to respect the rights of ethnic Germans in Poland, as well as to minimize the appeal of the right-wing Republikaner party to the German electorate.
As soon as German unity was assured, Kohl accepted Germany's boundaries as permanent, and he signed a treaty to that effect with Poland on November 14.
Five days later the second CSCE summit convened in Paris to proclaim the end of the Cold War. In the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the NATO and Soviet sides each pledged to limit themselves to 20,000 battle tanks and 20,000 artillery tubes, 6,800 combat aircraft, 30,000 other armored combat vehicles, and 2,000 attack helicopters.
The CSCE member states signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, in which the Soviet Union, Americans, and Europeans both east and west announced to the world that Europe was henceforth united, that all blocs-military and economic-had ceased to exist, and that all member states stood for democracy, freedom, and human rights.
Дарья Гармоненко